编者按：泽连斯基和特朗普在白宫的不欢而散，标志着欧洲寻求改善美欧关系的努力再次陷入困境，也成为推动欧洲追求战略自主的催化剂。在这种情况下，中欧关系又会出现哪些变化？合作的契机是否已经到来？
日前，清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波在《南华早报》发文指出，随着美国在国际事务中的角色逐渐调整，中国与欧洲的合作空间正在扩大。文章探讨了中美欧三边关系的未来走向，分析了中国在乌克兰战后重建和全球多边秩序维护中的潜在作用。观察者网和北京对话获授权翻译并发布中文版，内容如下。
【文/ 周波，翻译/ 王凡非】
美国副总统万斯在慕尼黑安全会议上的演讲，对震惊的盟友而言无异于背后一刀。他完全回避了如何结束乌克兰战争的问题，反而指责欧洲各国都背叛了共同价值观，忽视了对移民问题和言论自由的关切。
他的言论促使乌克兰总统泽连斯基表示，“欧洲与美国几十年来的旧关系正在结束”。
在特朗普第二任期的第一个月，他和他的幕僚们对美国形象的破坏比他所有前任加起来还要严重。
如果“美国治下的和平”正走向黄昏，那么这也标志着新时代的曙光初现。第61届慕尼黑安全会议以“多极化”为主题，与以往几届会议中诸如“西方缺失”和“双输”等情绪化的主题不同，“多极化”指向了未来的发展趋势。为呼应这一现实，近年来，越来越多来自亚洲和非洲的代表参加了这场以欧洲视角为中心的会议。
如果美国正从国际体系中退出，中国则正在以基于规则的秩序守护者的姿态进入。在慕尼黑，与万斯形成鲜明对比的是，中国外交部长王毅呼吁建立一个平等有序的多极世界，并表示中国将成为这一体系中的确定性因素。
一个单边主义的美国是中国和欧洲的最佳粘合剂。欧洲无法承受同时与中国进行贸易战和与美国关系紧张的局面。在会议召开前，欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩表示，欧盟与中国在贸易关系上仍有深化合作的空间，甚至有望“达成新的协议”。
改善与欧洲的紧张关系也符合中国的利益。中国不会通过欧洲的视角来看待俄罗斯，但中国也不需要为了俄罗斯而牺牲与欧洲的关系。
为了缓解欧洲对乌克兰战争的焦虑，展示其公正性，中国可以支持乌克兰参加直接关乎其未来的谈判。一旦达成停火或停战协议，中国还可以倡导包括欧盟在内的所有大国提供集体安全保障。
如果需要维和行动来稳定局势，中国——联合国安理会常任理事国中最大的部队派遣国——可以牵头与“全球南方”国家一起维和。俄罗斯肯定会认为北约在乌克兰的任何维和人员都是披着羊皮的狼。鉴于中国“基建狂魔”的实力，中国完全可以为乌克兰的战后重建提供有力支持。
最重要的是，中国和欧盟可以携手在多边体系中维护基于规则的秩序。毕竟，中国已经加入了几乎所有现有的政府间组织和国际公约。挑战在于布鲁塞尔方面。中国被欧盟官方同时描述为合作伙伴、经济竞争者和系统性对手。
这种大杂烩式的描述更多地反映了欧洲对中国的困惑，而非中国究竟是什么。多亏了特朗普，美国现在应该比中国更像一个经济竞争者和系统性对手。
有趣的是，到目前为止，特朗普对中国表现出了令人惊讶的热情。这体现在他邀请中国国家主席出席他的就职典礼，并呼吁中国帮助结束乌克兰战争。
特朗普关于中国和华盛顿可以“共同解决世界上所有问题”的声明，几乎让人想起美国前总统奥巴马对“两国集团”提议的拥抱。他对中国征收的10%关税增幅低于对加拿大和墨西哥延迟征收的25%关税。
墨西哥工厂
这是两国决斗前的鞠躬吗？无论如何，特朗普如今应该意识到，他那标志般的不可预测性在面对一个势均力敌的对手时几乎毫无用处。他对所有中国商品加征10%关税的举措，迅速招致了中国对部分美国进口产品的对等反制。当他将DeepSeek称为“美国工业的警钟”时，他无疑清楚，中国在某些高科技领域已超越美国。
特朗普的第二任期能为中美关系带来更多稳定吗？尽管这位商人转型的总统以交易著称，但他在第一任期留下的遗产却属于意识形态， 即两党一致的强硬对华共识。这或许并非他的本意，但蓬佩奥、纳瓦罗和莱特希泽等鹰派人物绑架了对华政策。即便是前总统拜登也未能摆脱其束缚。
这一次，共和党在美国国会中占据多数席位，加上特朗普对其团队的绝对掌控，若他有意，他完全有能力重塑自己的政治遗产。万斯演讲中最引人注目的并非他所言，而是他所未言——除了轻描淡写地提到俄罗斯和中国并非主要威胁，以及欧洲的最大威胁源于内部之外，他几乎避而不谈这两个国家。正可谓此时无声胜有声。
或许这位总司令希望将所有关键问题的王炸牢牢掌握在自己手中？时间将证明这种猜测是否只是空想。
【以下为英文原文】
US Vice-President J.D. Vance’s speech at the recently concluded Munich Security Conference was an unexpected stab in the back for America’s appalled allies. Without any talk on how to end the war in Ukraine, he accused European capitals of betraying their values and ignoring concerns over immigration and free speech.
His comments prompted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to say that “decades of the old relationship between Europe and America are ending”.
In the first month of his second term in office, Trump and his lieutenants have done more damage to America’s image than all his predecessors combined.
If this is the sunset of Pax Americana, it is also the dawn of a new era. The theme of the 61st Munich Security Conference was “multipolarisation”. Compared with the themes of past conferences such as “Westlessness” and “Lose-Lose”, which are expressions of emotions, multipolariasation points to the direction of the future. To reflect this reality, more Asian and African delegates have taken part in this Eurocentric conference in recent years.
If the US withdraws from the international system, China is moving in like a guardian of the rules-based order. In Munich, as a sharp contrast to Vance, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for an equal and orderly multipolar world, saying China would be a factor of certainty in this system.
A unilateral America is the best glue for China and Europe to stick together. Europe can’t afford to have a trade war with China and tension with the United States at the same time. Before the conference, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that there was room to strengthen trade relations and even “find agreements” with Beijing.
It is also in China’s interests to improve strained relations with Europe. China won’t view Russia through the prism of Europe, yet China does not need to sacrifice its relationship with Europe for Russia, either.
To alleviate Europe’s anxiety about the war in Ukraine, Beijing could best show its impartiality by supporting Kyiv’s inclusion in negotiations that have a direct bearing on its future. China can also champion a collective security guarantee by all major powers, including the European Union, once a ceasefire or armistice is reached.
If peacekeeping is needed to stabilise the situation, China – the largest troop-contributing country among UN Security Council permanent members – can lead in sending troops from the Global South. Russia would surely see any peacekeepers from Nato in Ukraine as wolves in sheep’s clothing. Given that China’s infrastructure-building efforts are second to none, Beijing can also help Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.
Most importantly, China and the EU can join hands in safeguarding the rules-based order in a multilateral system. After all, Beijing has joined almost all existing intergovernmental organisations and international conventions. The challenge is for Brussels. China is officially described as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival at the same time.
Such a hodgepodge description tells more about Europe’s confusion about China than what China actually is. Thanks to Trump, the US should now look more like an economic competitor and a systemic rival than China does.
It is intriguing how Trump, so far, has shown a surprising degree of cordiality towards Beijing. This is seen in his invitation to President Xi Jinping to attend his inauguration and his call for China to help end the war in Ukraine.
His statement that Beijing and Washington could work together “to solve all of the problems of the world” is almost a reminder of former US president Barack Obama’s embrace of the Group of Two proposal. His 10 per cent tariff hike on China is lower than the delayed 25 per cent tariffs on Canada and Mexico.
Is this bowing before a duel? Regardless, Trump should know by now that his signature unpredictability is of little use when dealing with a peer competitor. His 10 per cent tariff on all Chinese products was met with Chinese retaliatory tariffs on select American imports. He most certainly knows China’s advances in some hi-tech areas have already surpassed America’s, as evidenced by his description of DeepSeek as “a wake-up call for [US] industries”.
Could China-US relations become less volatile in Trump’s second term? Although this businessman-turned-president is transactional, the legacy he left after his first term is ideological – a domestically bipartisan agreement on confronting China. This may not be what he wanted but China hawks like Mike Pompeo, Peter Navarro and Robert Lighthizer hijacked American policy towards China. Even former US president Joe Biden could not walk out of this trap.
This time, with a majority of Republicans in the US Congress and absolute power over his team, Trump is best positioned to change his own legacy if he wants to. The most interesting thing about Vance’s speech is what he didn’t say – he barely mentioned Russia or China except to say they are not primary threats and that Europe’s biggest threats come from within. Such silence is too loud to ignore.
Perhaps the commander-in-chief wants to keep all the trump cards on top issues to himself? Time will tell if such speculation is merely a hallucination.
本文系观察者网独家稿件，文章内容纯属作者个人观点，不代表平台观点，未经授权，不得转载，否则将追究法律责任。关注观察者网微信guanchacn，每日阅读趣味文章。
